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We study the effects of differences in local financial development within an
integrated financial market. We construct a new indicator of financial develop-
ment by estimating a regional effect on the probability that, ceteris paribus, a
household is shut off from the credit market. By using this indicator, we find that
financial development enhances the probability an individual starts his own
business, favors entry of new firms, increases competition, and promotes growth.
As predicted by theory, these effects are weaker for larger firms, which can more
easily raise funds outside of the local area. These effects are present even when we
instrument our indicator with the structure of the local banking markets in 1936,
which, because of regulatory reasons, affected the supply of credit in the following
50 years. Overall, the results suggest local financial development is an important
determinant of the economic success of an area even in an environment where
there are no frictions to capital movements.
Since the work of King and Levine [1993], a large body of
empirical evidence has shown that a country’s level of financial
development impacts its ability to grow.1 Much of this evidence,
however, comes from a period when cross-border capital move-
ments were very limited. In the last decade, international capital
mobility has exploded. Does domestic financial development still
matter for growth when international capital mobility is high?
This is a difficult question to answer empirically. The inte-
gration of national financial markets is so recent that we lack a
sufficiently long time series to estimate its impact on the data. At
the same time, the pace of integration is so fast that if we were to
establish that national financial development mattered for na-
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tional growth during the last decade, we could not confidently
extrapolate this result to the current decade.
To try to assess the relevance for growth of national financial
institutions and markets in an increasingly integrated capital
market, we follow a different approach. Rather than studying the
effect of financial development across countries, we study the
effect of local financial development within a single country,
which has been unified, from both a political and a regulatory
point of view, for the last 140 years: Italy. The level of integration
reached within Italy probably represents an upper bound for the
level of integration international financial markets can reach.
Hence, if we find that local financial development matters for
growth within Italy, we can safely conclude that national finan-
cial development will continue to matter for national growth in
the foreseeable future. Of course, the converse is not true.
To test this proposition, we develop a new indicator of local
financial development, based on the theoretically sound notion
that developed financial markets grant individuals and firms
easier access to external funds. Using this indicator, we find
strong effects of local financial development. Ceteris paribus, an
individual’s odds of starting a business increase by 5.6 percent if
he moves from the least financially developed region to the most
financially developed one. Furthermore, he is able to do so at a
younger age. As a result, on average, entrepreneurs are five years
younger in the most financially developed region than in the least
financially developed one. Similarly, the ratio of new firms to
population is 25 percent higher in the most financially developed
provinces than in the least financially developed, and the number
of existing firms divided by population is 17 percent higher. In
more financially developed regions firms exceed the rate of
growth that can be financed internally by 6 percentage points
more than in the least financially developed ones. Finally, in the
most financially developed region, per capita GDP grows 1.2
percent per annum more than in the least financially developed
one.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of financial develop-
ment, we instrument our indicator with some variables that
describe the regional characteristics of the banking system as of
1936. A 1936 banking law, intended to protect the banking sys-
tem from instability, strictly regulated entry up to the middle
1980s, and differentially so depending on the type of credit insti-
tution (saving banks versus national banks). As a result, the
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composition of branches in 1936 greatly influenced the availabil-
ity of branches in the subsequent 50 years. For this reason, we
use the structure of the banking market in 1936 as an instrument
for the exogenous variation in the supply of credit in the 1990s, a
period when the market was fully deregulated.
These results are not driven by the North-South divide, since
they hold (even more strongly) when we drop Southern regions
from the sample. They also do not seem to be driven by a spurious
correlation between our instruments and other omitted factors
that foster growth. If this were the case, our instruments should
have been positively correlated with economic development in
1936. While we do not have provincial GDP in 1936, we do have
provincial GDP in 1951 (about the time when Italy regained the
prewar level of production) and number of vehicles per inhabit-
ants in 1936 (which is a pretty good proxy for GDP per capita in
1936). Within the Center-North of the country, there is no posi-
tive correlation between our instruments and these two indica-
tors of financial development.
Yet, the most convincing way to rule out possible local omit-
ted factors is to focus on some interaction effect, as is done in
Rajan and Zingales [1998]. Under the assumption, backed by both
theory and evidence, that dependence on local finance is greater
for smaller than for larger firms, the interaction between firm size
and our measure of local financial development should have a
negative coefficient on growth (the impact of financial develop-
ment on growth is less important for bigger firms). The advantage
of this specification is that we can control for omitted environ-
mental variables through regional fixed effects. That local finan-
cial development matters relatively more for smaller firms even
after controlling for regional fixed effects suggests that our re-
sults are not driven by omitted environmental variables.
In sum, all the evidence suggests that local financial devel-
opment plays an important role even in a market perfectly inte-
grated from a legal and regulatory point of view. Hence, finance
effects are not likely to disappear as the world becomes more
integrated or as Europe becomes unified.
While there is a large literature on financial development
and growth across countries (see the survey by Levine [1997]), the
only papers we know of that study within-country differences are
Jayaratne and Strahan [1996] and Dehejia and Lleras-Muney
[2003]. Using the deregulation of banking in different states of
the United States between 1972 and 1991 as a proxy for change
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in financial development, Jayaratne and Strahan show that an-
nual growth rates in a state increased by 0.51 to 1.19 percentage
points a year after deregulation. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney study
the impact of changes in banking regulation on financial devel-
opment between 1900 and 1940. Both papers show that local
financial development matters. They do that, however, in a finan-
cial market that was not perfectly integrated yet. In fact, even in
Jayaratne and Strahan’s sample period, there were still differ-
ences in banking regulation across states, and interstate branch-
ing was restricted. By contrast, during our sample period there
was no difference in regulation across Italian regions nor was
interregional lending restricted.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes
the data. Section II introduces our measure of financial develop-
ment, and Section III presents and justifies the instruments.
Section IV analyzes the effects of financial development on firms’
creation, and Section V on firms’ and aggregate growth. Section
VI explores whether the impact of local financial development on
firm’s markup and growth differs as a function of the size of the
firm, as predicted by theory. Section VII discusses the relation
between our findings and the literature on international financial
integration. Conclusions follow.
I. DATA DESCRIPTION
We use three data sets. First, the Survey of Households
Income and Wealth (SHIW), which contains detailed information
on demographic, income, consumption, and wealth from a strati-
fied sample of 8000 households. Table IA reports the summary
statistics for this sample.
An interesting characteristic of this data set is that each
household is asked the following two questions: “During the year
did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or a
mortgage from a bank or other financial intermediary and was
your application turned down?” and “During the year did you or
a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a
mortgage to a bank or other financial intermediary, but then
changed your mind on the expectation that the application would
have been turned down?” One percent of the sample households
were turned down (i.e., answered yes to the first question), while
2 percent were discouraged from borrowing (i.e., answered yes to
the second question). We create the variable “discouraged or
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turned down” equal to one if a household responds positively to at
least one of the two questions reported above and zero otherwise.2
The SHIW also contains information about the profession of
different individuals. Table IB reports summary statistics for the
individuals in the SHIW household sample.3 About 12 percent of
the individuals in the sample were self-employed, and the same
percentage had received a transfer from their parents.
We collected the second data set, containing information at
the province level on the number of registered firms, their rate of
formation, and the incidence of bankruptcy among them, from a
yearly edition of Il Sole 24 Ore, a financial newspaper. These are
the newspapers’ elaboration of data coming from the Italian Sta-
tistical Institute (ISTAT). Table IC reports summary statistics for
these data.
The third data set contains information about firms. It is
from Centrale dei Bilanci (CB), which provides standardized data
on the balance sheets and income statements of a highly repre-
sentative sample of 30,000 Italian nonfinancial firms.4 Table ID
reports summary statistics for these data.
II. OUR INDICATOR OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
II.A. Methodology
A good indicator of financial development would be the ease
with which individuals in need of external funds can access them
and the premium they have to pay for these funds. In practice,
both these avenues are quite difficult. We do not normally observe
when individuals or firms are shut off from the credit market, but
only whether they borrow or not. Similarly, we do not normally
have information on the rate at which they borrow, let alone the
2. When asked whether they have been rejected for a loan, households are
also given the option to respond “your demand has been partially rejected.” We
classify these as “rejected” households.
3. Since the sample is stratified by households and not by individuals, when
we sample by individuals certain groups are overrepresented. For example, more
people live in the South in this sample than in the household sample, reflecting
the fact that the average family size is larger in the South. The age is younger
than the household sample age, because we deliberately truncated age at 60.
4. A report by Centrale dei Bilanci [1992] based on a sample of 12,528
companies drawn from the database (including only the companies continuously
present in 1982–1990 and with sales in excess of 1 billion lire in 1990), states that
this sample covers 57 percent of the sales reported in national accounting data. In
particular, this data set contains a lot of small (fewer than 50 employees) and
medium (between 50 and 250) firms.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLES USED IN ESTIMATION








Credit rationed 0.137 0.00 0.344 0 1
Age 45.00 46.27 11.82 25 76
Male 0.85 1.00 0.352 0 1
Years of education 9.69 8.00 4.34 0 18
Net disposable income 47 41 33 6 155
Wealth 243 149 367 19 1,634
South 0.359 0.00 0.480 0 1








Entrepreneurs 1 0.14 0.00 0.35 0 1
Entrepreneurs 2 0.03 0.00 0.16 0 1
Age 39 39.00 11.90 16 59
Male 0.49 0.00 0.50 0 1
Years of education 9.70 8.00 4.18 0 18
Wealth 272 158 559 6 1,893
Have received transfers
from their parents?
Yes  1 0.12 0.00 0.33 0 1
Resident in the South 0.39 0.00 0.49 0 1








GDP per capita (million
lire) 25.35 24.16 10.62 12.17 54.76
GDP per capita in 1951
(million lire) 3.8 3.7 1.3 2.1 8.4
Judicial inefficiency 3.78 3.52 1.37 1.44 8.32
Firms’ creation per 100
inhabitants in 1995 1.14 1.12 0.34 0.53 1.95
Infrastructure in 1987 102.20 102.95 29.94 48.5 197.20
Average schooling in
1981 7.36 7.44 .85 5.75 10.29
Population growth 89–97 0.41 0.00 2.64 0.96 24.60
Number of firms per 100
inhabitants in 1995 9.18 9.02 1.55 6.17 12.77
Social capital 80.31 83.33 8.27 62.10 91.53
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TABLE I
(CONTINUED)








Financial development 0.28 0.32 0.13 0 0.50
Branches per million
inhabitants in the
region in 1936 193.732 190.992 110.499 57.049 530.548
Fraction of branches
owned by local banks
in 1936 0.745 0.741 0.167 0.463 0.972
Number of savings banks
per million inhabitants




region: 1936 8.207 7.574 6.118 0.000 21.655








Number of employees 103.33 32.00 1,167 2 970
Sales growth 0.074 0.073 0.25 0.706 0.685
Assets/sales 1.086 0.768 1.43 0.164 15.40
Markup 0.058 0.055 0.095 0.296 0.335
South 0.134 0.00 0.34 0 1
Panel A reports summary statistics for the households at risk of being rationed in the SHIW. This
includes all the households that have received loans and households that have been denied a loan or
discouraged from borrowing. Panel B reports summary statistics for the individuals in the SHIW (most
households have more than one individual). Panel C reports summary statistics for the controls and
instrumental variables used at the provincial level. Panel D reports summary statistics for the firms’ balance
sheet database. Panel E reports summary statistics for the Survey of the Manufacturing Firms. Credit
rationed is a dummy variable equal to one if a household responds positively to at least one of the following
questions: “During the year did you or a member of the household think of applying for a loan or a mortgage
to a bank or other financial intermediary, but then changed your mind on the expectation that the application
would have been turned down?” “During the year did you or a member of the household apply for a loan or
a mortgage to a bank or other financial intermediary and your application was turned down?” Age is the age
of the household head in the household sample and the age of the individual in the individual sample. Male
is a dummy variable equal to one if the household head or the individual is a male. “Years of education” is the
number of years a person attended school. Net disposable income is in million lire. Wealth is financial and
real wealth net of household debt in million lire. South is a dummy equal to one if the household lives in a
region south of Rome. Entrepreneurs 1 includes entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and retail sectors,
professionals (doctors and lawyers), and artisans. Entrepreneurs 2 includes only entrepreneurs, both in the
industrial and retail sectors. Intergenerational transfer is a dummy variable equal to one if a household
received transfers from their parents. Financial development is our indicator of access to credit (see Table II).
Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in millions of lire in 1990. GDP per
capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value added in the province expressed in 1990 lire. Judicial inefficiency
is the number of years it takes to have a first-degree judgment in the province. Firms’ creation is the fraction
of new firms registered in a province, during a year over the total number of registered firms (average
1992–1998, source ISTAT). Number of firms presents per 100 people living in the same area (average of
1996–1998, source ISTAT). Number of employees is the number of employees measured at the firm level
(average across years). Sales growth is the growth in nominal sales. Markup is profit on sales. South is a
dummy equal to one if the firm is located in a region south of Rome. Ownership is a dummy variable equal
to one if the firm has a single owner/shareholder. Age is the firm’s age.
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rate at which they should have borrowed in the absence of any
friction. For all these reasons, the studies of the effects of finan-
cial development (e.g., King and Levine [1993], Jayaratne and
Strahan [1996], and Rajan and Zingales [1998a]) have used al-
ternative measures.
Fortunately, SHIW asks households whether they have been
denied credit or have been discouraged from applying. Hence, it
contains information on individuals’ access to credit even during
normal periods, i.e., outside of a banking crisis. Furthermore,
unlike the U. S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, SHIW contains
precise information on the location of the respondents. Control-
ling for individual characteristics, it is possible, thus, to obtain a
local indicator of how much more likely an individual is to obtain
credit in one area of the country, rather than in another one. This
indicator measures how easy it is for an individual to borrow at a
local level.
This approach, however, begs the question of what drives
differences in financial development across Italian regions. If
demand for financial development generates its own supply, the
regions with the best economic prospects might have the most
financially developed banking system, biasing the results of our
analysis. For this reason, we will instrument our indicator of
financial development with exogenous determinants of the degree
of financial development.
II.B. Does the Local Market Matter?
One could object that such an indicator of financial develop-
ment is not very useful in so much as it measures a local condition
of the credit market. If individuals and firms can tap markets
other than the local one, local market conditions become
irrelevant.5
There is a growing literature, however, documenting that
distance matters in the provisions of funds, especially for small
firms. Petersen and Rajan [2002], for instance, document the
importance of distance in the provision of bank credit to small
firms. Bofondi and Gobbi [2003] show more direct evidence of the
informational disadvantage of distant lenders in Italy. They find
that banks entering in new markets suffer a higher incidence of
nonperforming loans. This increase, however, is more limited if
5. In Italy, as in the United States, restrictions on lending and branching
across geographical areas have been removed in 1990.
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they lend through a newly opened local branch, than if they lend
at a distance. Similarly, Lerner [1995] documents the importance
of distance in the venture capital market.
That distance is an important barrier to lending is very much
consistent also with the practitioners’ view. The president of the
Italian Association of Bankers (ABI) declared in a conference that
the banker’s rule-of-thumb is to never lend to a client located
more than three miles from his office.
Overall, this discussion suggests that distance may segment
local markets. Whether it does it in practice is ultimately an
empirical matter. If local market conditions do not matter, then
the geographical dummies should not have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on the probability of being denied a loan, a proposi-
tion we will test. Similarly, if markets are not segmented, our
measure of local financial development should have no impact on
any real variable, another proposition we will test.
Finally, the above discussion provides an additional testable
implication. If local market conditions matter, they should matter
the most for small firms, which have difficulty in raising funds at
a distance, than for large firms. Thus, analyzing the effect of our
indicator by different size classes will help test whether the effect
we find is spurious or not.
II.C. What Is the Relevant Local Market?
Italy is currently divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces.6
What is the relevant local market? According to the Italian An-
titrust authority, the “relevant market” in banking for antitrust
purposes is the province, a geographic entity very similar to a
U. S. county. This is also the definition the Central Bank used
until 1990 to decide whether to authorize the opening of new
branches. Thus, from an economic point of view, the natural unit
of analysis is the province.
There are, however, some statistical considerations. Since we
need to estimate the probability of rejection, which is a fairly rare
event (3 percent of the entire sample and 14 percent in the sample
of households who looked for credit), we need a sufficiently large
number of observations in each local market. If we divide the
39,827 observations by province, we have on average only 387
observations per province and less than 200 observations in al-
6. The number of provinces has recently increased. During our sample period
there were 95 provinces.
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most a third of the provinces. Therefore, we will be estimating
each indicator on the basis of very few denials (on average 12).
This casts doubt on the statistical reliability of the indicator. In
fact, when we estimate the indicator at the provincial level, 22
percent of the provincial indicators are not statistically signifi-
cant. More importantly, when we divide the sample into two and
estimate the provincial effect on the probability of being shut off
from the credit market prior to and after 1994, the correlation
between the indicators estimated in the first period and that
estimated in the second period is only 0.14, and it is not statisti-
cally significant. As a result, we focus on the results at the
regional level.
II.D. Description of our Results
Our goal is to identify differences in the supply of credit. The
probability a household is rejected or discouraged depends both
on the frequency with which households demand credit and on
the odds a demand for credit is rejected. To isolate this latter
effect, we would like to have the set of people who were interested
in raising funds. We do not have this information, but we can
approximate this set by pooling all the households that have some
debt with the households that we know have been turned down
for a loan or discouraged from applying. This group represents 20
percent of the entire sample, with an incidence of discouraged/
turned down equal to 14 percent.7
For ease of interpretation we estimate a linear probability
model of the likelihood a household is shut off from the credit
market. Each year we classify a household as shut off if it reports
it has been rejected for a loan application or discouraged from
applying that year. As control variables we use several house-
holds’ characteristics: household income, household wealth (lin-
ear and squared), household head’s age, his/her education (num-
ber of years of schooling), the number of people belonging to the
household, the number of kids, and indicator variables for
whether the head is married, is a male, for the industry in which
7. Note that any residual demand effect will only bias us against finding any
real effect of financial development. In fact, demand is likely to be higher in more
dynamic regions. Thus, if we do not perfectly control for demand, we will have
more dynamic regions incorrectly classified as more constrained. This distortion
will reduce the correlation between financial development and any measure of
economic performance.
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he/she works, and for the level of job he/she has.8 To capture
possible local differences in the riskiness of potential borrowers,
we control in this regression for the percentage of firms that go
bankrupt in the province (average of the 1992–1998 period). Since
we want to measure financial development (i.e., the ability to
discriminate among different quality borrowers and lend more to
the good one) and not simply access to credit, in the regression we
control for the percentage of nonperforming loans on total loans
in the province. This control should eliminate the potentially
spurious effects of overlending.9 Finally, we insert calendar year
dummies, an indicator of the size of the town or city where the
individual lives, and a dummy for every region.
Table II reports the coefficient estimates of these regional
dummies in ascending order. We drop the smallest region (Valle
d’Aosta) because it has only ten households in the sample at risk
and none rationed. In all the other regions the local dummy is
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
magnitude of these coefficients, however, covers a wide range.
The region with the lowest conditional rate of rejection (Marche)
has a rejection rate that is less than half the rejection rate of the
least financially developed region (Calabria). As one can see from
Table II, financially underdeveloped regions tend to be in the
South. The correlation is not perfect (0.64). This will allow us to
separate the effect of a pure South dummy from the effect of
financial underdevelopment. This might be overcontrolling, be-
cause the backwardness of the South, we will argue, can at least
in part be attributed to its financial underdevelopment. Never-
theless, it is useful to show that the effects we find are not
entirely explained by a South dummy. We will use this condi-
tional probability of being rejected as a measure of financial
underdevelopment. For ease of interpretation, however, we trans-
form this variable, so that it becomes an indicator of financial
development, not underdevelopment. Therefore, we compute
1  Conditional Probability of
Rejection/max {Conditional Probability of Rejection}.
8. Household wealth includes the equity value of the household’s house.
9. If in certain areas banks lend excessively (i.e., even to noncreditworthy
individuals), our measure of financial development (access to credit) would be
higher, but we can hardly claim the system is more financially developed. The
percentage of nonperforming loans should eliminate this potential spurious effect.
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This normalized measure of financial development, which we will
use in the rest of the paper, is reported in the third column of
Table II and in Figure I.
III. OUR INSTRUMENTS
If demand for financial development generates its own sup-
ply, the regions with the best economic prospects might have the
TABLE II






Marche (Center) 0.118 0.587
Liguria (North) 0.118 0.586
Emilia (North) 0.136 0.523
Veneto (North) 0.138 0.516
Piemonte (North) 0.151 0.472
Trentino (North) 0.155 0.457
Lombardia (North) 0.161 0.435
Friuli ven. (North) 0.168 0.410
Umbria (Center) 0.172 0.398
Sardegna (South) 0.179 0.374
Toscana (Center) 0.183 0.360
Abruzzo (South) 0.183 0.359
Basilicata (South) 0.187 0.347
Molise (South) 0.215 0.248
Sicilia (South) 0.225 0.214
Puglia (South) 0.238 0.165
Lazio (South) 0.266 0.067
Campania (South) 0.278 0.027
Calabria (South) 0.286 0.000
F test for regional effects  0
(p-value): F(19, 8060) 4.95
Prob  F 0.0000
The table illustrates our indicator of financial development. The coefficient on the regional dummies is
obtained from an OLS regression estimated using a subset of the household in SHIW. This subset includes
(a) households that have received a loan, (b) households that have been turned down for a loan, and (c)
households that are discouraged from borrowing. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to one if a
household is credit constrained (i.e., declares it has been turned down for a loan or discouraged from applying)
and zero otherwise. Besides including a full set of regional dummies, the regression includes a number of
demographic characteristics to control for individual effects that affect access to the credit market (age,
gender, type of job, income, family size, number of income recipients in the household), a control for the
percentage of bankruptcies in the province, and a control for the percentage of nonperforming loans in the
province. North is north of Florence, Center between Florence and Rome, and South is south of Rome. The
normalized measure is defined as 1  Regional effect/max {Regional effect} and is thus equal to zero in the
region with the maximum value of the coefficient on the regional dummy—i.e., the region less financially
developed, and varies between zero and one.
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most financially developed banking system, biasing the results of
our analysis. For this reason, we need to instrument our indicator
of financial development with exogenous determinants of the
degree of financial development. We find such determinants in
the history of Italian banking regulation.
FIGURE I
Financial Development by Region
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In response to the 1930–1931 banking crisis, in 1936 the
Italian Government introduced a banking law intended to protect
the banking system from instability and market failure, through
strict regulation of entry. Credit institutions were divided into
four categories, and each category was given a different degree of
freedom in opening new branches and extending credit outside
the city/province where they were located. National banks
(mostly State-owned) could open branches only in the main cities;
cooperative and local commercial banks could only open branches
within the boundaries of the province they operated in 1936;
while savings banks could expand within the boundaries of the
region they operated in 1936. Furthermore, each of these banks
was required to try to shut down branches located outside its
geographical boundaries. Finally, any lending done outside the
geographic boundaries determined by the law needed to be au-
thorized by the Bank of Italy. This regulation remained substan-
tially unchanged until 1985.
This regulation severely constrained the growth of the bank-
ing system: between 1936 and 1985 the total number of bank
branches in Italy grew 87 percent versus 1228 percent in the
United States.10 The effect of these restrictions was not homoge-
neous: local banks’ branches grew on average 138 percent versus
the 70 percent of big national banks. Among local banks, savings
banks had more latitude to grow, and so they did: 152 percent
versus the 120 percent of the cooperatives and the mere 37
percent of the other banks (although this category is a mix of local
and national banks). Can these differences explain the regional
variation in the availability of credit 60 years later?
To test this hypothesis, we estimate how much access to
credit in the 1990s can be explained by the level and composition
of the supply of credit in 1936. As a dependent variable we use our
measure of financial development, and as explanatory variables
we use the number of total branches (per million inhabitants)
present in a region in 1936, the fraction of branches owned by
local versus national banks, the number of savings banks, and the
number of cooperative banks per million inhabitants. As Table III
shows, all the variables have the expected sign, and this simple
10. See http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/
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specification explains 72 percent of the cross-sectional variation
in the availability of credit in the 1990s.11
These results suggest that our instruments are correlated
with the variable of interest (local access to credit); can we also
argue that they are uncorrelated with the error in our regressions
relating economic performance to financial development? To do
so, we need to show that the number and composition of banks in
1936 is not linked to some characteristics of the region that affect
the ability to do banking in that region and of firms to exist and
grow and that this regulation was not designed with the needs of
different regions in mind, but it was “random.”
III.A. Why Regions Differ in their Banking Structure in 1936?
There are two reasons—unrelated to economic develop-
ment—that explain why regions differ in their banking structure
in 1936.
11. In the 1990s there were no restrictions to lending across regions, nor
restrictions to entry. Hence, this result implies that entry takes time to occur and
that lending from a distance is not a perfect substitute for local lending.
TABLE III
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Financial
development
Branches per million inhabitants in the region in 1936 0.0006*
(0.0003)
Fraction of branches owned by local banks in 1936 0.6121***
(0.1758)
Number of savings banks per million inhabitants in the
region: 1936 0.0182*
(0.0088)
Number of cooperative banks per million inhabitants in






The table illustrates the determinants of financial development. The regression is an OLS. All the
right-hand-side variables describe the local structure of the banking system (at the regional level) as of 1936.
(***): coefficient significant at less than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient
significant at 10 percent.
943DOES LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MATTER?
First, the regional diffusion of different types of banks re-
flects the interaction between the different waves of bank crea-
tion and the history of Italian unification. Savings banks were the
first to be established in the first half of the nineteenth century
[Polsi 1996]. They started first in the regions that were under the
domination of the Austrian Empire (Lombardia and the North
East) as an attempt to transplant the experience of Austrian and
German charitable institutions. Only later did they expand to
nearby states, especially Tuscany and the Papal States, and only
very gradually. The 1936 distribution of savings banks deeply
reflects this history, with high concentration in the North East
and in the Center.
Second, the number of bank branches in 1936 was deeply
affected by the consolidation in the banking sector that took place
between 1927 and 1936. In 1927 there were 4055 banks with
11,837 branches located in roughly 5000 different towns. In 1936
the total number of branches was only 7656 covering just 3920
towns.12 This consolidation was orchestrated by the Government
who, during the 1930–1933 crisis, bailed out the major national
banks and the savings banks, but chose to let smaller commercial
banks and cooperative ones fail. Hence, between 1931–1933
stock-company banks went from 737 to 484 and cooperative
banks from 625 to 473, while savings banks went from 100 to 91.
As a result, the number of bank branches per inhabitant in
1936 is not very highly correlated with the level of economic
development of the region. The highest concentration was in
Veneto, a region at the time very underdeveloped. Unfortunately,
data on GDP per capita by province are not available in 1936, so
we use the number of cars per capita in a province as a proxy for
the degree of economic development. Table IV, panel A, shows the
correlation between number of bank branches per inhabitant in
1936 and the number of cars per capita in the same year. If we do
not control for a North-South divide, the number of cars per
capita is positively and statistically significantly correlated with
number of bank branches, but the R2 is only 0.116. When we
control for South, however, the correlation between number of
bank branches and the proxy for economic development of the
area becomes very small and statistically insignificant. Thus, if
we control for South, we can say that the number of bank
12. Bank of Italy [1977], p. XXIV.
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TABLE IV
1936 BANKING STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A
Bank branches per 1000
inhabitants in the region
in 1936
Fraction of bank
branches owned by local
banks in 1936
Number of cars per capita
in a province in 1936
.0119*** 0.0050 0.0031 0.0135**
(0.003) (0.0037) (0.0059) (0.048)
South dummy — 0.0904*** — 0.2156***
(0.0264) (0.0442)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R2 0.116 0.211 0.003 0.197
B
No. of savings banks per
1000 inhabitants in the
region in 1936
No. of cooperative banks
per 1000 inhabitants in
the region in 1936
Number of cars per capita
in a province in 1936
0.0002 2.0e-5 0.0006*** 0.0003
(0.0001) (1.36e-5) (0.0002) (0.0025)
South dummy — 0.0026*** — 0.0033*
(0.001) (0.0017)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R2 0.028 0.095 0.067 0.094
C
Bank branches per 1000




local banks in 1936
Log of provincial value
added per capita in 1951
0.1110** 9.16e-06*** 0.076 0.135***
(0.045) (1.48e-06) (0.047) (0.048)
South dummy — 0.174** — 0.238***
(0.066) (0.033)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R2 0.095 0.407 0.027 0.381
D
No. of savings banks per
1000 inhabitants in the
region in 1936
No. of cooperative banks
per 1000 inhabitants in
the region in 1936
Log of provincial value
added per capita in 1951
0.003*** 0.0010 0.004** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
South dummy — 0.003*** — 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 95 95 95 95
R2 0.126 0.271 0.050 0.079
The dependent variables describe the regional banking structure in 1936. In panels A and B economic
development as of 1936 is measured by the number of vehicles per capita in a province; in panels C and D by
the level of GDP per capita in 1951. Standard errors, which are reported in brackets, are adjusted for
clustering at the regional level. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant
at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10 percent.
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branches per inhabitant in 1936 is not positively correlated with
unobserved factors that drive economic development.
The same can be said for the other characteristics of the 1936
banking system that we use in our analysis. The diffusion of local
banks versus national banks tends to be negatively correlated
with economic development at that time. As shown in Table IV,
the fraction of local branches that are controlled by local banks is
positively but not significantly correlated with the number of cars
per capita, but when we control for the North-South divide, the
correlation becomes negative and statistically significant. The
correlation between number of savings banks and 1951 GDP per
capita is positive, but after we control for South this positive
correlation disappears. Similarly, the number of cooperative
banks per inhabitant is negatively and statistically significantly
correlated with the measure of economic development, but if we
control for the North-South divide, the correlation is no longer
statistically significant. In panels C and D we check these results
using as a proxy for economic development at the time of the
banking law the level of GDP per capita in a province in 1951, the
earliest available date. Essentially the same conclusions hold
when we use GDP per capita to measure economic development in
1936.
In sum, the 1936 law froze the Italian banking system at a
very peculiar time. If we exclude the South, the structure of the
banking industry in 1936 was the result of historical accidents
and forced consolidation, with no connection to the level of eco-
nomic development at that time.
III.B. Why Did the 1936 Law Favor Savings Banks?
Establishing that the initial conditions were “random” is not
sufficient to qualify the 1936 law as the perfect instrument. We
also need to make sure that the differential treatment imposed by
the law is not driven by different regional needs. Why did the
1936 banking law favor savings banks and penalize the national
banks?
Savings banks were created and controlled by the local aris-
tocracy. In 1933, for instance, 16 percent of the savings banks’
directors were noble [Polsi 2003]. Traditionally, nobles were big
landowners, who strongly supported the Fascist regime. This
political connection is also demonstrated by the fact that 65
percent of savings banks’ directors had the honorific title of
“Cavaliere” (knight). This title was granted by the King and was
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awarded to local notables who were politically well connected.
Hence, the first reason why the Fascist regime heavily supported
savings banks both during the crisis and in the drafting of the
1936 law is that savings banks were controlled by strong allies of
the regime.
This alliance, and possibly the main reason for the regime’s
support, is also shown in the destination of its profits. By statute,
savings banks were nonprofit organizations, which had to distrib-
ute a substantial fraction of their net income to “charitable activ-
ities.” Until 1931 these donations were spread among a large
number of beneficiaries. Subsequently, however, the donations
became more concentrated toward political organizations created
by the Fascists, such as the Youth Fascist Organization (Opera
Balilla) and the Women’s Fascist Organization (OMNI) [Polsi
2003]. Not surprisingly, the Fascist regime found it convenient to
protect its financial supporters!
Only apparently more complex is the position of the regime
toward the large commercial banks. During the 1931–1932 crises,
the regime was forced to bail them out (an example of the too-
big-to-fail rule). Having experienced first hand the threat posed
by big banks to the stability of the entire financial system, the
Regime chose to balance the system by limiting the growth of the
largest players. These restrictions, however, might have contrib-
uted to the lack of sympathy between the Fascist regime and
Banca Commerciale (the biggest one), which remained a hotbed of
political opposition even after being nationalized. In fact, its
research department became the breeding ground of what will
become the Italian anti-Fascist intelligentsia after World War II.
In sum, we think that the level and composition of bank
branches in 1936 is a valid instrument to capture the exogenous
variation in the supply of credit at the regional level. Since the
above analysis suggests that this is particularly true when we
exclude the South, we will test the robustness of all our results to
the omission of Southern regions.
IV. EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON FIRMS’ CREATIONS
Our first interest is the impact of financial development on
economic mobility. We start from a very micro level: how does the
degree of financial development affect the probability that an
individual will start his own business? We then complement this
evidence with more aggregate data on the rate of firms’ creation
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in a province. Finally, we look at whether differences in the ease
of entry induced by differences in financial development also
impact the degree of competition. Since in all these regressions
our main variable of interest (financial development) varies only
at the regional level, we correct the standard errors for the
possible dependence of the residuals within regional clusters.
IV.A. Effects on the Probability of Starting a Business
The SHIW contains information about people’s occupations.
In particular, it identifies individuals who are self-employed. This
is a broad category that includes bona fide entrepreneurs, both in
the industrial and the retail sectors, professionals (doctors and
lawyers), artisans, plumbers, electricians, etc. While the financ-
ing needs of these different occupations differ widely, it is safe to
say that all of them require access to financing more than work-
ing as an employee. For this reason we start our analysis focusing
on the broader category. We exclude from the population “at risk”
to become self-employed: students, preschool children, retirees
(people older than 60), people unable to work because of disabil-
ity, and military.
Besides calendar year dummies, as control variables we use
a combination of both individual characteristics and regional
characteristics. As individual characteristics we use a person’s
age, his level of education, his sex, and a dummy variable equal to
one if a household received an intergenerational transfer.13 We
also insert three local characteristics, both measured at the pro-
vincial level.
First, we use the level of per capita GDP as a measure of
economic development of the area. Since a higher level of per
capita income is also associated with a higher level of per capita
capital, this latter variable can also be interpreted in the context
of Lucas’ [1978] model of occupational choice and size of firms. A
higher level of per capita capital boosts the productivity of em-
ployees, making it relatively more attractive for an individual to
be employed. Thus, we expect the sign of per capital GDP to be
negative.
Second, we try to control for the efficiency of the local court
13. We do not control for the level of wealth because this is endogenous. In
spite of this objection, we tried inserting it, and the results were very similar.
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system by inserting the average number of years it takes to have
a first-degree judgment in the province.14
Third, we control for the level of “social capital” in the prov-
ince. As Putnam [1993] has shown, Italian regions differ widely in
their level of trust, mutual cooperation, and civicness. Higher
levels of trust and mutual cooperation foster both financial devel-
opment (since Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2004]) and eco-
nomic activity. The first effect is already captured by our indica-
tor of financial development, but the direct effect not. Hence, we
insert a measure of social capital in the regression. Following
Putnam and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, we use electoral
participation in referenda as a measure of social capital.15
Table V presents the results. Column 1 reports the probit
estimates of the impact of these variables on the probability an
individual is self-employed. In more financially developed regions
the probability a person becomes self-employed is indeed higher,
and this effect is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent
level. The effect is also economically significant. Moving from
Calabria (the most financially underdeveloped region according
to our indicator) to Marche (the most financially developed) in-
creases a person’s probability of starting his own business by 5.6
percentage points, equal to 40 percent of the sample mean. This
result is also consistent with the literature on liquidity con-
straints and entrepreneurship.16 By contrast, social capital does
not appear to have an independent effect.
The individual characteristics have mostly the expected ef-
fect. Older people and males are more likely to start their own
business. Not surprisingly, a transfer also significantly raises the
probability of starting a business. More surprising, it is the nega-
tive and statistically significant impact of education. This result,
14. In Italy judicial decisions are routinely appealed, and a case is not
considered closed until all the appeals have been decided upon. This takes much
longer. The number we report here is the average amount of time to the end of the
first-level trial.
15. We also experimented with voluntary blood donation, the alternative
measure of social capital used in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2004] and
obtained similar results.
16. For example, Evans and Jovanovic [1989] find that individuals with more
assets are more likely to become self-employed. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen
[1994a, 1994b] find that individuals who receive intergenerational transfers from
their parents are more likely to succeed in running small businesses. Bonaccorsi
di Patti and Dell’Ariccia [2001] find that firm creation is higher in local markets
with more bank competition, a result consistent with competition among inter-
mediaries easing liquidity constraints.
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however, is consistent with what Evans and Jovanovic [1989] find
for the United States.
Column 2 reestimates the same specification inserting a
dummy variable equal to one for regions located in the South of
Italy. While this is overcontrolling (part of what is different about
the South is the lower level of financial development), it is im-
portant to ascertain that the effect we found is not simply a
North-South difference. And column 2 shows it is not. Individuals
located in the South are significantly less likely to start their own
business, but only marginally so (a 0.1 percent drop in the prob-
ability, equal to 1 percent of the sample mean). Introducing a
Southern region dummy only minimally impacts the size of the
coefficient of financial development.
One possible objection is that our indicator of financial de-
velopment is measured with noise or, alternatively, is correlated
with some unobserved determinant of entrepreneurship. To ad-
dress this problem in column 4, we estimate a linear probability
model and instrument our indicator with a set of instruments
describing the provincial banking structure in 1936: number of
branches per million inhabitants in the region, share of branches
of local banks, number of savings banks per million inhabitants,
and number of cooperative banks per million inhabitants. For
ease of comparison, column 3 reports the corresponding OLS
estimates.
The IV coefficient is almost identical to the OLS counterpart
and remains statistically different from zero. One problem with
using the 1936 data as instruments is that there might be some
omitted factor that is correlated with the level and the composi-
tion of the local banking industry and with the ability of a certain
region to grow. One possible way to address this concern is to
insert a proxy for the potentially omitted factor. This is what we
do in the last column. If the instruments are only picking up the
level of economic development at the time, then we should find no
effect after inserting the level of per capita GDP in 1936. Since
the first date for which provincial GDP numbers are available is
1951, we use GDP at this date. The results are virtually un-
changed, suggesting that our instruments are valid instruments.
Since we have seen that our instruments are uncorrelated with
GDP per capita if we exclude the South, in the last column we
reestimate the IV coefficient excluding observations from the
South. The coefficient is virtually unchanged and remains signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level.
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In all these estimates we used standard errors that are
clustered at the regional level. While this procedure is efficient in
a large sample, there are some questions about its finite sample
properties [Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004]. An alter-
native technique suggested in this paper is to collapse the data at
the regional level, after partialling out the individual effects. We
report the p-values obtained using this technique in the last row
of Table V (and in all subsequent tables). The OLS estimate is
significant at the 2 percent level, the IV one at the 15 percent, and
the IV without South at the 2 percent. As Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan recognize, this technique lacks power; thus, that
the results are significant or close to significant at conventional
levels is extremely encouraging.
IV.B. Effects on the Age at which People Become Entrepreneurs
Another way to test whether the improved access to funds
brought by financial development affects the opportunity to be-
come an entrepreneur is to look at the average age of entrepre-
neurs in different areas. Better access to funds should allow
people to become entrepreneurs at a younger age; hence in more
financially developed regions the average age of existing entre-
preneurs should be lower.
In Table VI we test this proposition. We restrict our attention
to a narrower definition of entrepreneur: we exclude from the
sample all professionals (doctors and lawyers), artisans, plumb-
ers, electricians, etc. Therefore, this definition includes only pure
entrepreneurs. This category is the least distorted by subsidies.
For instance, there are a lot of subsidies to encourage younger
generations to become artisans, and these subsidies are not ho-
mogeneous across different regions. By using this definition, we
compute the average age of entrepreneurs in each province, and
then we regress this average on the level of economic and finan-
cial development of each province. As column 1 shows, more
financially developed regions have younger entrepreneurs on av-
erage, and this effect is statistically significant. Moving from the
least financially developed region to the most financially devel-
oped, one decreases the average age of entrepreneurs by five
years. This effect is robust to controlling for Southern regions
(column 2), but it becomes smaller (three years) and marginally
insignificant when we use instrumental variables (columns 3 and
4). However, when we exclude the South, the IV estimate becomes
bigger than the OLS one and returns to be statistically signifi-
952 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
cant. It is also significant when we collapse the data at the
regional level.
IV.C. Effects on the Entry on New Firms
If financial development increases the likelihood an individ-
ual starts a business, it should also increase the aggregate rate of
firms’ formation and, overall, the number of existing firms. Table
VII tests these predictions.
Table VIIA analyzes the creation of new firms. The depen-
dent variable is the fraction of new firms registered in a province
during a year scaled by the number of inhabitants. It is an
average for the period 1992–1998. The explanatory variables are
our indicator of financial development in the region, the per
capita GDP in the province, the level of economic delinquency,
and our measure of social capital. As column 1 shows, financial
TABLE VI
SELF-EMPLOYED AGE AND LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial 8.3117** 8.2923** 5.8957 6.0256 11.4730**
development (3.2015) (3.2449) (4.8297) (4.5803) (4.6583)
Per capita 124.1770** 136.3543** 132.2601*** 148.2946*** 134.6580**
GDP/1000 (44.1353) (47.9748) (45.9894) (43.2360) (56.4051)
Judicial inefficiency 0.4637 0.5191 0.4921 0.6157* 0.9670
(0.3471) (0.3411) (0.3095) (0.3271) (0.7122)
Social capital 0.0744 0.0144 0.0144 0.0147 0.1343
(0.0961) (0.1518) (0.1415) (0.1386) (0.1957)
South 2.0242 2.0302 1.3773
(2.5451) (2.5146) (2.6273)
Per capita 0.6965 0.4765
GDP/1000 in 1951 (0.4509) (0.5142)
Observations 92 92 92 92 59




data [0.022] [0.019] [0.234] [0.146] [0.017]
The dependent variable is the average age of the self-employed in the province, calculated only including
the entrepreneurs, both in the industrial and retail sectors. Financial development is our indicator of access
to credit (see Table II). Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable income in the province in million lire.
Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to have a first-degree judgment in the province. Social
capital is measured by average voter turnout at the province level for all the referenda in the period between
1946 and 1987. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome. IV uses as instrument a set of
variables that describes the banking market as of 1936. GDP per capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value
added in the province expressed in 1990 lire. Standard errors are reported in brackets. (***): coefficient
significant at less than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10
percent.
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TABLE VII
FIRMS’ CREATION AND LOCAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
A: Entry of new firms
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial 49.057** 49.084** 44.149*** 44.481*** 42.048**
development (17.83) (20.61) (16.79) (16.25) (19.92)
Per capita 1.221*** 1.155*** 1.150*** 1.036*** 1.245***
GDP/1000 (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.27) (0.23)
Judicial inefficiency 2.424 2.648 2.716 3.475 4.757
(2.71) (2.53) (2.40) (2.49) (4.44)
Social capital 0.788 1.165 1.229 1.203 1.816*
(0.54) (0.86) (0.75) (0.76) (1.10)
South — 8.803 8.799 5.395
(11.50) (11.07) (12.10)
Per capita — — — 0.004** 0.003*
GDP/1000 in 1951 (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 100 100 100 100 65
R2 0.187 0.190 0.1894 0.203 0.222
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.007] [0.014] [0.048] [0.103] [0.090]
B: Number of firms per capita in the region
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial development 2.595** 2.595** 2.926* 2.960** 2.037
(1.09) (1.05) (1.51) (1.42) (1.25)
Per capita GDP/1000 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Judicial inefficiency 0.042 0.047 0.052 0.018 0.06
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
Social capital 0.082*** 0.073** 0.069*** 0.068** 0.058
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
South 0.198 0.198 0.352
(0.51) (0.48) (0.48)
Per capita GDP/1000 in 1951 2.595** 2.595** 2.926* 2.960** 2.037
(1.09) (1.05) (1.51) (1.42) (1.25)
Observations 100 100 100 100 65
C 0.377 0.378 0.377 0.392 0.100
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.074]
In panel A the dependent variable is the fraction of new firms registered in a province during a year scaled by
population. It is an average for the period 1992–1998. In panel B the dependent variable is the number of firms located
in a province per 100 people living in the same area. It is an average for the period 1996–1998. Per capita GDP is the
per capita net disposable income in the province in million lire. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to
have a first-degree judgment in the province. Social capital is measured by average voter turnout at the province level
for all the referenda in the period between 1946 and 1987. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome.
IV uses as instrument a set of variables that describes the structure of the local banking markets as of 1936 (see Table
III). Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than
1 percent; (**): coefficient significant at 1 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 5 percent. A constant is also included in
the regressions (coefficient not reported).
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development favors the formation of new firms, and this effect is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (even when collaps-
ing the data at the regional level). Moving from the least finan-
cially developed region to the most financially developed one
increases the ratio of new firms to population by 25 percent,
roughly one firm for every 400 inhabitants. This result is consis-
tent with Black and Strahan [2003] who find that in the United
States competition in the banking market is associated with a
higher level of new incorporations because banking competition
leads to more credit availability. Our result provides evidence of
the direct link between credit availability and firms’ creation.
Interestingly, unlike the result of the micro regression, the
effect of per capita GDP is negative and statistically significant,
as predicted by Lucas’ [1978] model. Judicial inefficiency has a
negative effect on firm creation, but this is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero.
Inserting the South dummy (column 2) does not alter the
results. The dummy itself has a negative, but statistically insig-
nificant, coefficient. Finally, in columns 3 we instrument our
indicator of financial development with a set of variables that
describes the structure of the local banking market as of 1936.
The magnitude of the coefficient of financial development re-
mains similar in level and retains statistical significance at the 1
percent level. The same is true if we drop observation from the
Southern regions (column 5).
Table VIIB analyzes the number of firms present in a prov-
ince per 100 people living in the same area. Our dependent
variable is an average of this indicator for the period 1996–1998.
As column 1 shows, more financially developed areas have more
firms. The difference between the most and the least financially
developed region can explain a difference of 2.8 firms per 100
people, equal to almost two standard deviations in numbers of
registered firms. Interestingly, here the level of social capital is
statistically and economically significant. One standard deviation
in social capital leads to a 0.44 standard deviation increase in the
number of firms per inhabitant.
Column 2 inserts a dummy for the Southern regions. This
dummy has a negative and statistically significant impact on the
level of firms. Once we account for Southern regions, the magni-
tude of the impact of financial development drops by 30 percent,
but it remains statistically significant. The estimates obtained
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using instrumental variables are similar (column 3), even when
we drop the South (column 5).
IV.D. Effects on the Degree of Competition in the Local Market
Thus far, we have shown that in financially developed re-
gions people can more easily start a business, and this leads to a
higher rate of entry of new firms and also a higher number of
firms overall. Does this have any major economic consequence?
The obvious place to look at is profit margins. Does this higher
rate of entry lead to lower profit margins?
To answer this question, we use our third data set, contain-
ing firms’ balance sheets information. Since we have information
only where a firm is located and not where it sells its product, we
need to assume that there is some degree of correlation between
its location and the market it operates in. This assumption is
fairly realistic given that we are mostly talking about small firms.
We measure the markup as earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization divided by sales. We regress this
measure on our indicator of financial development and a series of
control variables. To control for industry-specific characteristics,
we insert eighteen industry dummies. Then, we control for firm
size, calendar year dummies, per capita GDP, and level of eco-
nomic delinquency. The results are contained in Table VIII.
As column 1 shows, firms in more financially developed re-
gions have, ceteris paribus, a smaller markup. According to this
estimate, firms in the most financially developed region have a
markup 1.3 percentage points lower than in the least financially
developed region, i.e., 23 percent below the sample mean. Thus,
the effect is both statistically significant and economically rele-
vant. This effect is robust to inserting a dummy for Southern
regions (column 2), and to instrumenting financial development
(columns 3) and also to instrumenting and dropping Southern
regions at the same time (column 5).
In principle, these differences in the entry of new firms and
the degree of competition could also be attributed to geographical
clustering in industry specialization. Suppose that certain areas
of the country are specialized in industries or segment of indus-
tries where the optimal firm size is small. Then, in these areas we
would observe more firms, more competition, and also more entry,
since barriers to entry are smaller when the optimal size of a firm
is smaller. This could explain why these characteristics are posi-
tively correlated in the data, but why are they positively corre-
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lated with financial development? If this is the direction of cau-
sation, we should find a strong negative correlation between
financial development and firm’s size.
To test this, we regress the logarithm of firms’ sales on our
indicator of financial development, eighteen industry dummies,
calendar year dummies, per capita GDP, and level of judicial
inefficiency, and firms’ profitability. This latter variable is obvi-
ously endogenous. Removing it, however, does not change our
results. In all specifications (not reported) the estimated coeffi-
cient of financial development is negative, but is statistically
insignificant. Thus, geographical clustering in optimal firm size is
unlikely to be the driving force behind our results.
In sum, we have looked at the effect of financial development
TABLE VIII
FIRMS’ MARKET POWER AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial development 0.0228** 0.0230** 0.0201** 0.0207** 0.0300***
(0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0090)
Per capita GDP/1000000 0.0055 0.0060 0.0060 0.0061 0.0069
(0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0046)
Judicial inefficiency 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Log (size) 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Social capital 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
South — 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0037)
Per capita GDP/1000 in
1951
— — — 1.32e-08 1.79e-07
(4.14e-07) 3.67e-07
No. Obs. 296,846 296,846 296,846 296,846 258,016
Adj. R2 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0248
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.014] [0.038] [0.104] [0.078] [0.029]
The left-hand-side variable is a measure of the market power of the firm. Following Domowitz, Hubbard,
and Petersen [1986], we compute the firm’s profit margin on unit price as (value added  labor costs)/(total
income  change in stocks); for a price-setting firm with constant returns to scale, the lower the elasticity of
demand the higher the margin and thus its market power. Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable
income in the province in million lire. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to have a
first-degree judgment in the province. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Social capital is
measured by average voter turnout at the province level for all the referenda in the period between 1946 and
1987. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome. All regressions include a full set of time and
industry dummies. IV uses as instrument a set of variables that describes the structure of the local banking
markets as of 1936. GDP per capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value added in the province expressed in
1990 lire. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient
significant at less than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10
percent.
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on entry from very different points of views: from the micro point
of view—the occupational choice; from the macro point of view—
the number of new and existing firms; and from the industrial
organization point of view—lower profits margins. From all these
different angles a consistent picture emerges: financial develop-
ment facilitates entry.
V. EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON FIRMS’ GROWTH
Finally, we explore whether the local level of financial devel-
opment affects firms’ rate of growth. Existing firms can, at least
in part, finance growth via internally generated cash. Thus, we
expect financial development to have an impact only on the
growth in excess of the one that could be internally financed.
Following Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic [1998], we compute
the maximum rate of internally financed growth and then use it
as a control variable in the regression. This rate is obtained
following the “percentage of sales” approach to financial planning
[Higgins 1977]. Under reasonable assumptions, the maximum
rate of growth internally financed is
max g ROA/1 ROA,
where ROA is the return on assets.17
The dependent variable is the annual nominal rate of growth
in sales. Besides the maximum rate of growth that could be
internally financed, our explanatory variables include firm’s size,
a dummy for the industry a firm belongs to, GDP per capita in the
province, our measure of courts’ inefficiency, our measure of so-
cial capital and, of course, our regional indicator of financial
development. A full set of calendar year dummies accounts for
any aggregate shock to nominal sales growth, including inflation.
As Table IX shows, local financial development has a positive
and statistically significant effect on firm’s growth (which re-
mains significant even when we collapse the data at the regional
level). Ceteris paribus, a firm located in the most financially
developed region grows 5.7 percentage points faster than a firm
located in the least financially developed region, i.e., 77 percent
faster than the average firm. Thus, the effect is also very sizable
17. The assumptions are i) the ratio of assets used in production to sales is
constant; ii) the firm’s profit rate for unit of sales is constant; iii) the economic
depreciation of assets equals that reported in the financial statements; iv) all the
profits are reinvested.
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from an economic point of view. When we insert a dummy for
Southern regions (column 2), the economic magnitude of this
effect is unchanged. When we instrument the indicator of finan-
cial development (column 3), the magnitude of the coefficient
slightly decreases, but remains highly statistically significant. If
we control for 1951 per capita GDP or exclude Southern regions,
the IV estimates return to be almost the same as the OLS one and
retain their statistical significance.
V.A. Effects on Aggregate Growth
Since we have seen that financial development fosters the
entry of new firms and the growth of existing ones, it should also
have an impact on the aggregate rate of growth. We test this
TABLE IX
THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON FIRMS’ GROWTH
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial development 0.0754*** 0.0762*** 0.0703*** 0.0768*** 0.0710**
(0.0168) (0.0191) (0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0240)
Internally financed growth 0.0971*** 0.0969*** 0.0971*** 0.0970*** 0.0985***
(0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0098)
Per capita GDP/1000000 0.1210 0.1390 0.1390 0.2030** 0.1350
(0.0739) (0.0900) (0.0892) (0.0990) (0.0850)
Judicial inefficiency 0.0017 0.0022 0.0020 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Size 0.0149*** 0.0149*** 0.0145*** 0.0149*** 0.0137***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Social capital 0.0015*** 0.0013* 0.0014* 0.0012* 0.0017*
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
South — 0.0053 0.0049 0.0073 —
(0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0104)
Per capita GDP/1000 in
1951
— — — 1.7e-06 2.36e-06
(1.4e-06) (1.58e-06)
No. obs. 252,101 252,101 252,101 252,101 217,834
Adj. R2 0.0608 0.0608 0.0608 0.0609 0.0617
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.042] [0.001]
The left-hand-side variable is the annual rate of growth in sales. The maximum rate of growth internally
financed is max g  ROA/(1  ROA), where ROA is the return on assets. Per capita GDP is the per capita net
disposable income in the province in million lire. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to have
a first-degree judgment in the province. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Social capital is
measured by average voter turnout at the province level for all the referenda in the period between 1946 and
1987. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome. All regressions include industry and time
dummies. IV uses as instrument a set of variables that describes the structure of the local banking markets
as of 1936. GDP per capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value added in the province expressed in 1990 lire.
Standard errors, reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less
than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10 percent.
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prediction in Table X. We measure growth as the rate of growth
of per capita GDP in a province between 1989 and 1997. In the
tradition of growth regressions (see Barro [1991]), we control for
several factors: the beginning of the period (1989) GDP per capita;
the quality of infrastructure present in a province at the begin-
ning of the period (measured as the availability of infrastructure
in the province as of 1987); the level of human capital, measured
as the average years of schooling in the province in 1981; the
population growth between 1989 and 1997; our measure of court’s
inefficiency and our measure of social capital.
After controlling for all these variables, the level of financial
TABLE X
LOCAL GROWTH AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OLS OLS IV IV IV-no South
Financial development 0.0209** 0.0233*** 0.0377*** 0.0377*** 0.0232**
(0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0098)
Per capita GDP/1000 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0030***
in 1989 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Infrastructures in 1987 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Average schooling in 0.0053** 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 0.0004
1981 (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0028)
Population growth 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Judicial inefficiency 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0029**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Social capital 0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
South 0.0176*** 0.0182*** 0.0182***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Per capita GDP/1000 0.0001 0.0000
in 1951 (0.0007) (0.0008)
Observations 93 93 93 93 57
R2 0.552 0.647 0.6308 0.6309 0.7555
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.431] [0.039] [0.047] [0.048] [0.166]
The dependent variable is the rate of growth of per capita GDP between 1989 and 1997. Financial
development is our indicator of access to credit (see Table II). Per capita GDP is the per capita net disposable
income in the province in million lire. Infrastructure is an indicator of the level of infrastructure at the
provincial level in 1987. Average schooling is the average years of schooling in the province in 1981.
Population growth is the growth of population between 1989 and 1997. Judicial inefficiency is the number of
years it takes to have a first-degree judgment in the province. Social capital is measured by average voter
turnout at the province level for all the referenda in the period between 1946 and 1987. South is a dummy
equal to one for regions south of Rome. IV uses as instrument a set of variables that describes the structure
of the local banking markets as of 1936. GDP per capita in 1951 is the 1951 per capita value added in the
province expressed in 1990 lire. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1 percent; (**): coefficient significant
at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10 percent.
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development has a positive and statistically significant impact on
growth (column 1). The effect is also economically sizable. Moving
from the least to the most financially developed region boosts the
growth rate by 1.2 percentage point a year. When we insert a
control for Southern regions (column 2), the effect remains sub-
stantially unchanged.
Interestingly, when we instrument our indicator of financial
development, the effect increases by 30 percent (column 3). This
seems to suggest that the noisiness of our indicator of financial
development tends to bias downward our estimate of the impact
of financial development on growth. If we instrument and exclude
the South at the same time (column 5), the coefficient returns to
be similar to the OLS one, but remains statistically significant at
the 5 percent level.
In sum, the data seem to confirm that the micro effects we
have documented also have an impact at the macro level. An
interesting and unexplored question is how much these differ-
ences in financial development can explain regional differences in
economic development. To assess the potential importance of this
factor in an unreported regression, we relate the level of per
capita GDP in a province to the local level of financial develop-
ment, instrumented with the 1936 banking structure variables.
Not only does local financial development have a positive and
statistically significant effect, but also its magnitude is economi-
cally very relevant: 60 percent of the difference in per capita
income between Milan and Rome—about 50 percent—could be
explained by the difference in their local levels of financial devel-
opment. Of course, many other factors play a role. Nevertheless,
this is further evidence that local financial development matters.
VI. TESTING THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF LOCAL
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Since our measure of financial development is regional, there
is always the fear that some other local factors, correlated with
financial development, could drive the results. To overcome this
problem, we use a technique similar to the one introduced by
Rajan and Zingales [1998] in the cross-country context. If we
make an assumption on which firms rely more heavily on the
local sources of finance, then we can test whether firms that
depend more heavily on local sources benefit more from being
located in more financially developed regions, while controlling
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for fixed local characteristics. Hence, we can separate whether
the effect is really driven by financial development or by some
other local characteristics.
From a theoretical point of view, we do not expect all firms to
be equally affected by local financial development. Both Berger et
al. [2001] and Petersen and Rajan [2003] find that small firms are
less likely to borrow at a distance making them more dependent
from the level of local financial development. Reliance on local
finance, thus, should be inversely related to size. Hence, the effect
of local financial development should be stronger for smaller
firms. We test this proposition in Table XI, with the two firm-level
variables we have: firm’s growth and firm’s markup. In these
regressions we can control for regional fixed effects, which absorb
the effect of any local characteristic.
In the first two columns the dependent variable is growth in
firms’ sales. Besides all the variables present in the basic speci-
fication used in Table IX, here we insert regional fixed effects and
the product of financial development and firm size.18 If the pre-
viously estimated effect of financial development is not spurious,
we expect that the product of local financial development and firm
size has a negative coefficient: bigger firms benefit proportion-
ately less from it. This is indeed what we find, and the coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (5 percent level
when we collapse the data at the regional level). The same is true
when we instrument financial development with the 1936 bank-
ing structure variables.
This methodology also allows us to better separate the effects
of financial development from those of social capital. For this
purpose, in column 3 we insert the interaction between social
capital and firm size. This interaction is negative and significant,
suggesting that in areas with more social capital small firms grow
relatively faster. The effect of financial development is reduced by
a third, but it is still significant at the 1 percent level.
In columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table XI, we repeat the same
experiment using markup as a dependent variable. Since the
average effect of financial development on markup (which is
captured by the regional fixed effect) is negative and bigger firms
should be less affected by it, we expect the coefficient of the
18. The level of financial development is obviously absorbed by the regional
fixed effects. We are still able to estimate the coefficient of judicial inefficiency
because these data vary at the provincial level.
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product of regional financial development and firm size to be
positive. In fact, in the OLS regression the coefficient is negative,
albeit not statistically different from zero. When we instrument
with the 1936 banking structure variables, however, the coeffi-
cient of the interaction between regional financial development
and firm size becomes positive and statistically significant. The
same is true when we insert the interaction between social capital
and size. Thus, using both dependent variables, the effect of local
financial development is robust to the insertion of regional fixed
effects.
To have a better sense of the quantitative importance of local
finance for firms of different sizes, in Table XII we split the
sample into four. The first group is composed of small firms, with
less than 67 employees. We chose this cutoff because it represents
the seventy-fifth percentile of firms’ distribution. The second
group is composed of what in Italy we would call medium firms,
with a number of employees between 67 and 275 (the ninety-fifth
percentile of the distribution). Large firms, those with more than
275 employees, form the third group. Finally, we isolate a group
of really large firms, with more than 500 employees.
Table XIIA reports the markup regressions. As expected, the
effect of financial development on markup seems to be present
only among small and medium firms. The effect is quantitatively
much smaller (only one-third) and not statistically significant for
large and very large firms.
Table XIIB reports the sample splits for the growth regres-
sions. Not surprisingly, small firms, which represent 75 percent
of the sample, behave as the sample as a whole (column 1). The
impact on medium firms is similar (column 2). More interestingly,
the impact of financial development on growth in large firms is
one-third of that in medium firms. As to be expected, the impact
of financial development on very large firms is zero, both economi-
cally and statistically.
That the effects of local financial development are limited to
small firms is important from a political economy point of view
(see Rajan and Zingales [2003]). Large and established firms do
not get any benefit from local financial development; in fact, they
are hurt because it increases the competition at the local level.
Thus, they are not very likely to push for it. The real beneficiaries
are small firms and would-be entrepreneurs, a group that is
hardly very influential at the political level.
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TABLE XII
SAMPLE SPLITS BY FIRM SIZE
Panel A: firm’s markup
Small Medium Large Very large
Financial development 0.0181* 0.0289*** 0.0120 0.011
(0.0112) (0.0053) (0.0142) (0.0168)
Per capita GDP/1000000 0.0691 0.0562 0.0979** 0.0464***
(0.0516) (0.0306) (0.0462) (0.0063)
Judicial inefficiency 0.00003 0.0015 0.0011 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0033)
Log (size) 0.0031*** 0.0018 0.0069*** 0.0065*
(0.009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0025)
Social capital 0.00035* 3.23e-06 0.0002 0.0003
(0.00018) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0007)
South 0.0009 0.0032 0.0032 0.0062
(0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0067)
No. obs. 224,579 58,168 14,099 6,294
Adj. R2 0.0250 0.0241 0.0317 0.0467
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.069] [0.002] [0.745] [0.987]






Financial development 0.0660** 0.0865*** 0.0276 0.0072
(0.0258) (0.0229) (0.0351) (0.0446)
Internally financed
growth
0.0857*** 0.0787*** 0.0971*** 0.0991***
(0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0233) (0.0201)
Per capita GDP/1000000 0.02490 0.4050*** 0.4360*** 0.4140**
(0.1090) (0.0659) (0.1220) (0.1910)
Judicial inefficiency 0.0018 0.0045** 0.0040 0.0030
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0055)
Social capital 0.0014** 0.0007 0.0012 0.0019
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0017)
Size 0.0306*** 0.0005 0.0020 0.0041
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0041)
South 0.0040 0.0096 0.0167 0.0078
(0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0152) (0.0213)
No. obs. 187,454 51,032 13,615 6,397
Adj. R2 0.0626 0.0643 0.0687 0.0787
p-values of financial
development after
collapsing the data [0.069] [0.002] [0.745] [0.225]
In panel A the left-hand-side variable is a measure of the market power of the firm (see notes to Table VI). In panel
B it is the average collection period, defined as the average level of accounts receivable (sum of beginning of period and
end of period stock divided by 2) scaled by sales and multiplied by 365. Small firms have less than 67 employees;
medium firms between 67 and 275; large firms more than 275; and very large firms more than 500. The maximum rate
of growth internally financed is max g ROA/(1 ROA), where ROA is the return on assets. Per capita GDP is the
per capita net disposable income in the province in million lire. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to
have a first-degree judgment in the province. Social capital is measured by average voter turnout at the province level
for all the referenda in the period between 1946 and 1987. South is a dummy equal to one for regions south of Rome.
Regressions include industry dummies, time dummies (where appropriate). All regressions are IV estimates using as
instrument a set of variables that describes the structure of the local banking markets as of 1936. Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are adjusted for regional clustering. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1 percent; (**):
coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10 percent.
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VII. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
We started our analysis on the premise that Italy repre-
sented a market perfectly integrated from a legal and regulatory
point of view; i.e., Italy had no regulatory barriers that prevented
capital from moving freely across regions.19 Nevertheless, our
evidence points to some type of friction. Firms in Naples are more
starved for funds than firms in Milan. How can this be an inte-
grated market?
To confirm this impression, in Table XIII we compute the
correlation between savings and investments across Italian re-
gions. Since Feldstein and Horioka [1980], this is the traditional
way to measure market segmentation. As Table XIII shows, there
exists a positive and statistically significant relation between
savings and investment even across Italian regions (albeit this
correlation is smaller in magnitude than the one found across
countries). This correlation persists unchanged even after all the
restrictions on banking are lifted (column 2). How can we explain
this? Does this not make Italy a de facto nonintegrated market,
nonsuitable to analyze the effects of an integrated international
market?
To explain this apparent contradiction, it is useful to distin-
guish between two types of mobility. There is mobility of a dollar
(actually a lira) between two financial intermediaries located in
19. In fact, during our sample period even the restrictions to bank location








Regional dummies YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
No. obs. 19 19
Left-hand-side is the ratio of gross regional investment to gross regional product. Savings/GDP is the
ratio of gross regional saving to gross regional product. Regional and year fixed effects are included in the
regressions but not reported. Standard deviations are in brackets. (***): coefficient significant at less than 1
percent; (**): coefficient significant at 5 percent; (*): coefficient significant at 10 percent.
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different regions/countries and the mobility from a local interme-
diary to a local borrower. If either one of these two types of
mobility is impaired, local investments will be correlated with
local savings. In particular, even if a lira can be easily moved from
a bank in Milan to a bank in Naples, it cannot go to finance an
investment project in Naples without the help of a local interme-
diary who screens the good from the bad projects. If that local
expertise is missing, it would appear as if there are no profitable
investment opportunities in Naples, even when firms are starved
for cash. The truth is that there are no investable profit opportu-
nities, i.e., investment opportunities that can be profitably
exploited.
Hence, even in a world where funds can freely flow from place
to place, the quality of local financial intermediaries will continue
to matter. Since international financial market integration has
reduced regulatory barriers and made it easier to move money
from country to country, but it has not changed the importance of
this “last mile” in the money network. Our paper can legitimately
be interpreted as concluding that local financial development will
continue to matter for the foreseeable future.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Financial markets are becoming increasingly integrated
throughout the world. Does this mean that domestic financial
institutions become irrelevant? Our paper suggests not. We show
that even in a country (Italy) that has been fully integrated for
the last 140 years, local financial development still matters.
Therefore, domestic financial institutions are likely to remain
important in a financially integrated Europe and, more broadly,
in a financially integrated world for some time to come.
Our evidence also suggests that, as predicted by theory, local
financial development is differentially important for large and
small firms. Not only does this result support the existence of a
causal link between local financial development and real eco-
nomic variables, but it also raises some questions on the economic
effects of financial integration. As Europe and the world are
becoming more integrated, large firms will become increasingly
uninterested in the conditions of the local financial system, while
small firms will continue to rely on it. Hence, depending on the
initial size distribution of firms and the minimum threshold to
access foreign capital markets, the political support in favor of
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domestic financial markets might vanish or strengthen as the
world becomes more financially integrated. Policy-makers work-
ing on the European integration should seriously consider this
effect, which might explain the persistent underdevelopment of
vast areas in Italy 140 years after unification.
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